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By Eric A. Havelock. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1978. Pp. ix, 382. $16.50.

THE GREEK CONCEPT OF JUSTICE.*

In his classic study, The Discovery of the Mind, Bruno Snell
observed that the shaping of Western thought by its beginnings
in Greek thought has paradoxically impeded our ability to understand Greek authors: "Because we are accustomed to regard the
Greek way of thinking as obligatory, we instinctively-or should
we say naively?-project it also into thought processes of another
order. " 1 The achievements of the later Greeks, especially Plato
and Aristotle, have erected mental barriers to our comprehension
of their predecessors.
Snell explored the Greeks' gradual discovery of the human
intellect by carefully analyzing their expression and use of language. Professor Havelock, in The Greek Concept of Justice,
adopts a similar developmental approach in tracing from Homer
to Plato the uses of dike ("justice") and •its derivatives. The evolution of dike, for Havelock, is closely related to the transition of
Greek society from its oral to its literate stage. We do not know
exactly when that transition occurred {pp. 9-10). We know that
the Iliad and the Odyssey were orally composed, but not whether
that manner of composition was a matter of artistic choice or of
necessity. Havelock suggests that the early Hellenic period (900650 B.C.) in which the poems were evidently composed was probably either nonliterate or semiliterate; that is, that Homer had
no choice {p. 9). Since that period saw the genesis of classical
Greek culture, including the consolidation of villages into poleis
and the rise of Greek moral and social consciousness, Havelock
asks how cultural progress could have been made without written
documents (pp. 10-11, 55).
In preliterate societies, Havelock postulates, the epic or its
equivalent stores and transmits culture, conserving the nomos
and ethos, the life-style and proprieties, of the audience which
hears it. Meter, music, and narrative are mnemonic and pedagogical aids. A literate society would preserve such information primarily through didactic statements: ·Thou shalt not steal. In a
preliterate society, instruction is by indirection, and society's
nomos and ethos are revealed through actions performed by
agents rather than through didactic statements: Agamemnon's
seizure of Achilles' slave-girl provokes a feud among the Greeks
• This book review was prepared by an Editor of the Michigan Law Review.-Ed.
1. B. SNELL, Tm: DISCOVERY OF THE MIND vii (1953).
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that destroys their military campaign against the Trojans until
Agamemnon redresses the injury (p. 220).
Because the Homeric epics preserved culture in this way,
their presentation of "justice" is particular ~nd situational.
"Justice" as an abstract normative principle does not appear (pp.
13-14). In the Iliad, "justice" is a procedure for resolving disputes
before a mass audience whose witnessing of the contending parties' confessions, vows, ·and settlements substitutes for written
documents as a record of the event (pp. 133-37). "Justice" is the
replacement of physical conflict with a form of public negotiation. It is an intracity propriety, existing in the Iliad within the
context of intercity warfare. Within the city, disputes are properly resolved peacefully through negotiation. There is no similar
sense of propriety between cities, where disputes are violently
resolved. In the Odyssey, "justice" appears primarily as the intercity propriety of acting hospitably to guests. "The Odyssey,"
Havelock observes, "is par excellence the oral encyclopedia of the
maritime complex, encoding and reporting and recommending
those patterns of pan-Hellenic behavior which also could protect
interpolis traffic and enable the complex to work" (p. 177).
Havelock's important point is that in neither epic does Homer
identify "justice" as an abstract "principle with a priori foundations, either as a 'rule of law' or as a moral sense in man. . . .
This kind of justice is simply the conservation of existing mores,
or the correction of a violation. It does not prescribe what in
general the mores 'ought' to be" (pp. 180-81).
.
Havelock theorizes that the progression of Greek society into
literacy enabled later Greek writers to approach an abstract concept of justice, a process that reached fruition with Plato (pp. 1314). Literacy obviated the need to store information orally and for
the mnemonic devices that were necessary to do so. Nomos and
ethos could be discussed without narrative, without "agents acting or behaving in response to other agents" (p. 221). Literacy
made possible the use of nonpersonal subjects and objects, as well
as verbs that "indicate not actions or situations which take place
in time but relationships connected by a timeless logic" (p. 221).
The verb "to be" played a particularly important role in the
development of "justice" as an abstract concept; it became truly
copulative (xis y) and thus capable of expressing abstract identification only as Greek became a written language (pp. 221, 23348).
The temporal priority of Homer to Hesiod has been debated
since the fifth century B.C., but Havelock argues persuasively
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that Hesiod composed in a more literate age than did Homer, and
probably with a text of Homer in front of him (pp. 214-15). Hesiod's poems bear many of the hallmarks of oral composition, but
one notices a gradual abandonment of narrative and an increasing use of impersonals (p. 226). Hesiod was the first of the Greeks
to isolate justice as a topic, yet he failed·to articulate an abstract
concept of "justice" because the linguistic conditions of preliteracy were still strong. Hesiod could describe what "justice" did,
but not what it was (p. 232). In this sense, he was protoliterate
and protoconceptual (p. 232).
After Hesiod, "justice" was not again isolated as a topic until
Plato, perhaps some 250 years later, though "justice" appears
incidentally in intervening authors. Havelock sees an increasingly
abstract use of "justice" in this period, and particularly an advance toward the use of "to be" as a copula. However, the poetic
traditions of orality, especially narrative, prevented the appearance of "justice" as an abstraction (p. 14). Solon (circa 600 B.C.)
was an Athenian statesman, lawgiver, and poet. What fragments
we have of his code are addressed to the legal specifics offactual
situations; only in his poems do we get any glimpse of the
"justice" that presumably informed his legislation (p. 252). In the
poems, he uses "justice" in its preliterate sense as a procedure for
resolving disputes. There is no conception of "justice" as a normative principle (pp. 253, 262). In the pre-Socratic philosophers
"justice does not exceed the logical limits of that propriety and
regularity which was the fundamental form of Homeric society,"
though the word was cosmologically extended to explain natural
phenomena (p. 271). In Aeschylus (525/4-456 B.C.), "Justice collides with Justice" (p. 295): "justice" appears in contradictory
uses in different dramatic situations and is symbolically exploited for artistic purposes rather than fixed with a philosophical
definition. We do not find out what "justice" is (pp. 293-95).
"Justice" is nonconceptual in Herodotus (fifth century B.C.) as
well, though Havelock observes that the appearance in the
History of a new word for "justice", dikaiosune, marked an important step in the process of abstraction since that appearance
indicated "that there is a justice within man as well as one which
he operates in society" (p. 306).
Unlike those in the oral tradition, Plato discarded the mnemonic devices of narrative and meter. Further, he used the verb
"to be" as a copula to denote logical, static relationships between
subjects and predicates (p. 325). His Republic was the first discussion of "justice" as a topic since Hesiod. As a fully literate
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author, Plato could conceptualize "justice" as a normative principle (p. 14). Plato's "justice" has two aspects, a public and a
private one. As a social formula, Plato's "justice" does not greatly
differ from that of the oral tradition: the "just" man responds to
the traditional rules of propriety that protect the no mos and ethos
of Greek society (p. 320). Plato rejects, however, the procedural
aspects of "justice" that were particularly prominent in the Iliad:
the "just" society will have no disputes to resolve, and so will not
need remedial procedures (p. 321). Havelock observes, "Plato's
justice, as writ large in the city, becomes the symbol of unchanging stability" (p. 321). More important to Plato than this social
formula was his theory of "justice" as a purely personal morality,
as an ordering of the psyche to provide the individual "the same
unshakeable, unchanging stability that the polis enjoys" (p. 322).
This was a radical break from tradition, and one previously impossible because of the failure of previous authors to abstract
"justice" from the particular situations in which they found it.
Plato's rejection of poetry in the Republic, Havelock suggests,
was based on that historical failure (pp. 330-32).
Havelock combines the developmental approach to the study
of Greek thought, adopted from Snell, with the approaches of the
"oralist" school, represented by Marshall McLuhan and Walter
Ong. Havelock acknowledges his sympathy with McLuhan's
aphorism "The medium is the message," agreeing that "the
character of a given technology of communication exercises considerable control over its content" (p. 336). However, he dissents
from some oralists' disparagement of "linear literacy," since,-as
his book demonstrates, the shift from orality to literacy in ancient
Greece clearly produced "liberating consequences for the mind"
(p. 336). In the widest sense, Havelock's point is that, while
today's technological orality offers added possibilities for communication, we should not lose sight of the advantages of written
communication, specifically, its superior ability to convey philosophical concepts. Postliteracy differs significantly from preliteracy in having the choice of communicating through writing. Modern oral media may supplement, but will not replace, written
communication (p. 336). On this level, and as a history of the idea
of justice in ancient Greece, Havelock's book is a success.

